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right to be protected?

Questions have

not unfrequently arisen respecting the
burial place of the dead, and nearly all
the cases are of that nature. In such
cases the equitable jurisdiction of the
courts has usually been invoked. See
the remarks of POTTER, J., in Pierce v.
Swan Hill Cemetery, already quoted. I
the same case it is said that, in such
cases "no common-law action could
avail much. The owner of the lot
might have trespass quare clausum, &c.,
but he could only recover damages in
money.
He might have an aetio of
detinue for the body, or so much earth,
&c., taken away; or, perhaps, might
have replevin ; * * * hut it is easy to
see that neither form of action affords
a sufficient remedy, or could, with any
certainty, restore the boly to the proper
custody. Equity only can give a full
and complete remedy, and we think the
jurisdiction is fully adequate to it." It
is more than doubtful whether replevin
or detinue will lie. See Guthrie v.
Weaver, 1 'Mo. App. 141. It is believed that no case can be cited directly
holding that either will lie. It seems
clear that trover will not lie. See 2
East P. C., ch. 16, sect. 89, supra.
The right of sepulture in England is a
common-law right, hut the mode of
burial is a subject of ecclesiastical cognisance: Rex v. Coleridge, 2 B. & Aid.
is to be observed that in
806. "It
every sepulchre, that hath a monument,
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two things arc to be considered, viz. :
the monument, and the sepulture or
burial of the dead. The burial of the
cadaver (that is caro data vennibus), [a
cadendo] is nullius in hloni, and belongs
to ecclesiastical cognisance; but as to
the monument, action is given (as bath
been said) at the common law for defacing thereof." See 3 Coke's Inst. 203.
"All matrimonial and other causes
of ecclesiastical cognisance, belonged
originally to the temporal courts (ride
the case of Legitimation and Bastardy,
Sir J. Davies's Rep. 140, and his
argument in the ease of Prwmunire, id.
273) ; and when the spiritual courts
cease, the cognisance of such .causes
would seem, as of course, to revert back
to the lay tribunals."
Per KENT, Ch.,
in Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Cl.
343, 347. As we have no ecclesiastical
courts in this country, burial rights, such
as are applicable to our condition, must,
if enforced at all, be enforced by the
temporal courts, and, as already state]l,
courts of equity are the only ones that
can give full and complete relief. See,
generally, the report of Mr. Ruggles,
above cited.
See also Fox v. Gordonj
11 Weekly Notes Cases 302.
From every point of view the principal case seems founded both upon
principle and authority.
MARSHALL D. EWELL.
Chicago.
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HUNTER v. MOUL.
The mere acceptance from a debtor of his own note or the note of a third person,
on account of an antecedent debt, is not a payment of such debt, but in the absence
of a special agreement must be considered as conditional payment or as collateral
security.
When the transfer of a note is a conditional payment it is necessary to inquire
what the trtue condition was, and if not fulfilled by the person accepting it what injury, if any, has resulted from the breach.

HUNTER v. MOL.
If the debtor transfer the note by delivery only without endorsement he is not
within the strict rule of the law merchant requiring notice of non-payment, and is
only relieved from his original indebtedness by the absence of such notice, so far as
he can show actual damage by Iaches of the creditor.
The fact that the creditor upon non-payment of the note, accepted from the maker
in lieu thereof a draft, which was subsequentlyalso protested, will not relieve the
original debtor unless a loss resulted to him by reason of such exchange.

APPEAL from a judgment entered on the report of a referee.
The important facts found by him are substantially these: Hunter
was indebted on book account to Moul in the sum of some $1100 or
$1200. On being asked for payment, he replied he had no money,
but had the promise of a note of $900 from Camp & Randell, payable in four months, and he would give that to Moul to get discounted and use the money. The. latter answered he did not want
the note, but that Hunter should get it discounted and give him the
money. To this Hunter replied that he was a stranger, and could
not get it discounted, but Moul should take the note and get it
discounted, and he, Hunter, would stand for it and see it was paid.
Moul assented to this. The note was made payable to him and sent
to him. It was not endorsed by Hunter. Moul had it discounted
at bank and received the proceeds. When it matured, it was protested for non-payment, and taken up by Moul. In lieu thereof,
and soon thereafter, Moul took fPom Camp & Randell their two
drafts of $450 each, payable at twenty and thirty days respectively,
and wrote Hunter, informing him of the fact, but received no
answer. The draft first falling due was paid at maturity, the other
was protested for non-payment, and Moul wrote, Hunter, informing
him thereof. This draft remained in the hands of Moul. Treating it as no payment, he sought to recover of Hunter on the original account, a sum equal to the amount of the draft.
The contention before the referee was whether the circumstances
under which Moul took the note, or his subsequent action in relation thereto, compelled him to apply it as a payment on the account
against Hunter. There was no express agreement to accept the
note as payment, nor to give time for the payment of the account.
The referee found that the note was not taken by Moul as absolute
payment of so much of the indebtedhess of Hunter, and technically
not as collateral security therefor, but, inasmuch as paper so held
has been called collateral by the courts, he treated it as such. He
further found Moul was guilty of no negligence in failing to collect
the note, and that he did not so convert it to his own u-e as to bar

HUNTER v. MOUL.

his right to recover of Hunter, and awarded judgment in favor of
Moul, from which judgment Hunter appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MERCUR, J.-The mere acceptance from a debtor of his own
note, or the note of a third person, in case of an antecedent indebtedness, is not a payment of the indebtedness. In the absence of a
special agreement, it must be considered as a conditional payment
or as collateral security. The debtor continues liable for his own
debt in the event of a failure of payment of the note thus given or
transferred: Leas v. James, 10 S. & R. 307; Mc Crinn v. Holmes,
2 Watts 121; Weakly v. Bell, 9 Id. 273; McIntyre v. Kennedy,
5 Casey 448; Brown v. Scott, 1 P. F. Smith 357; Loque v.
Waring & Co., 4 Norris 244.
When the transfer of a note is a conditional payment, it is necessary to inquire what the true condition was, and if not fulfilled
by the person accepting it, what injury, if any, has resulted from
the breach. The cases are not in harmony as to the effect of a failure to present the note of a third person, and give notice of its
dishonor, when no injury therefrom has resulted to the debtor.
We shall not attempt to review them, but refer to some which we
think correctly rule this case. Great regard must be had to the
character of the transaction. If the debtor endorse the note, a
more stringent rule prevails as to notice than if he transferred it
by delivery only. When the guarantee is absolute, that a specific
act shall be done by another, it was said in Vinal v. Bikardson,
13 Allen 521, demand and notice need not be averred, although
the want of them may be a defence on the ground of negligence
to the extent of the resulting injury. One who has merely guaranteed it, but whose name is not on the bill or note, is not in general entitled to notice of non-payment: Chitty on Bills 498. So
on page 441, it is farther said, in general if the bill or note be
given as collateral security, and the party delivering it were no
party to it, either by endorsing or transferring it by delivery when
payable to bearer, but merely caused it to be drawn or endorsed or
delivered over by a third person as security, or has merely guaranteed the payment, it has been considered that he is not within the
custom of merchants an endorser or party to it, so as to be absolutely entitled to strict regular notice, nor discharged from his liabilities by the neglect of the holder to give him such notice, unless
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he can show by express evidence, or by inference, that he has actually sustained loss or damage by the omission. The reason is,
when a person delivers over a bill to another without endorsing it,
he does not subject himself to the obligations of the law merchant,
and cannot be sued on the bill. As he does not subject himself to,
the obligation, he is not entitled to the advantages. If he can
prove he has sustained damages, then he is discharged only to the
extent of such actual damages: Id. The guarantor of a note does
not stand in the same situation as parties to it. His obligation is
in the nature of an insurance of the debt, and there is no need of
the same proof to charge him as if he was an endorser. The necessitv of demand in order to charge the endorser of a, bill is solely
grounded on the custom of merchants, and applies only to actions
against the endorser on the bill itself. It does not apply when the
guarantor is not an endorser: Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 S. & R. 201;
Overton v. Taceey, 14 Id. 311; ilcLughan v. Bovard, 4 Watts
308. The law is clearly stated in 2 Parsons on Bills 184, where
it is said if paper be transferred by delivery only as security for
a pre-ekisting debt, and it is dishonored while in the hands of the
transferee, it affects in no way the debt it was intended to secure.
The original liability remains what it was, and upon dishonor of
The paper, it is not even necessary to give him notice thereof as an
endorser, but the debtor may show in defence any injury he has
sustained by the actual laches of the creditor. Nor does the fact
that the collaterals were exchanged for other securities, which were
ultimately found worthless, change the liability unless it is further
shown that a loss resulted to the owners of the collaterals by reason
of such exchange: Girard Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. JMarr,
10 Wright 504.
The name of the plaintiff in error was neither in nor on the note.
It was not payable to bearer. He was in no sense a party to it.
With a view that the proceeds when paid should discharge an
amount of his indebtedness equal thereto, he caused it to be made
payable to his creditor and put into his hands. Through no fault
of that creditor it was not paid. It is not shown that it could, at
any time, have been collected of the makers. The acceptance from
the makers of their two drafts was no payment, but did result in
the payment of one-half the amount. Having sustained no loss or
damage by any act of his creditor, the plaintiff in error has no
just -cause of complaint at being still held liable for his indebted-
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ness. The creditor was not obliged to give up the unpaid draft
before bringing this suit. It is not shown to be of any value, but
if valuable he has a right to retain all the securities in his hands
until he obtains satisfaction of the debt due him.
Judgment affirmed.
The general rule is now well settled in
accordance with the doctrine announced
in the particular case, that the taking of
a note of the debtor or of a third person,
is not payment unless it is so agreed. This
principle has been affirmed in most of
our courts, and has been sustained as follows: U. S. §up. Court: The Kimball,
*3 Wall. 37 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pat.
532. Alabama: 31yatts v. Bell, 41
Ala. 222 ; Lee's Adm'r v. Fontaine, 10
Id. 755; Fickling v. Brewer, 38 Id.
685; McCrary v. Carrington, 35 Id.
698.' Arkansas: Brugman v. McGuire,
32 Ark. 733. California: Ponce v. McElvy, 47 Cal. 154. Colorado: Collins
v. Dawley, 4 Col. 138. Connecticut:
Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day 516; Davidson
v. Bridgeport, 8 Conn. 477; Bill v.
Porter, 9 Id. 31. Florida: May v.
Gamble, 14 Fla. 467. Illinois: Archibald v. Argall, 53 Ill. 309 ; White v.
Jones, 38 Id. 159 ; Rayburn v. Day, 27
Id. 46. Indiana: ilfaxwell v. Day, 45
Ind. 509 ; Vitenour V. M1athews, 42 Id.
7 ; Jeffriesv. Lamb, 73 Id. 202. Iowa:
Farwell v. Grier, 38 Iowa 83 ; Huse v.
lcDaniels, 33 Id. 406; Kephart v.
Butcher, 17 Id. 240. Kansas: iMedberry

Goode, 67 Mo. 126; Howard v. Jones,

33 Id. 583; Appleton v. Kennon, 19 Id.
Nebraska: Young v. Hibbs, 5
637.
Neb. 433. New Hampshire: Ladd v.
Wiggin, 35 N. H. 421, 426 ; Randlet v.
Herren, 20 Id. 102; Clark v. Draper,
19 Id. 423; Smith v. Smith, 27 Id. 244.
New Jersey: Wildrick v. Swain, 34
N. J. Eq. 167; Hutcdnson v. Swartsweller, 31 Id. 205; T'eeholders v.
Thomas, 20 Id. 41. Ohio: Sutliff v.
Atwood, 15 Ohio-St. 186,' 198; .31Vaughten v. Partridge, 11 Ohio 223,
232. Pennsylvania: Leas v. James,
10 S. & R. 307 ; M11cGinn V. Hobes, 2
Watts 121 ; Brown v. Scott, 51 Penn.
St. 357 ; League v. Waring, 85 Id. 244.
Rhode Island: Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4
R. I. 388. South Carolina: Thomas v.
Kelly, 3 S. 0. (N. S.) 214; Mars Y.
Conner, 9 Id. 76; Gardner v. Bust, 2
Tennessee: Andrews T.'
Rich. 601.
German National Bank, 53 Tenn. 211,
222; Union Bank v. Smiser, 33 Id. 501,
514. Virginia: Blair v. IJilson, 28
Gratt. 165. West Virginia: Stephenson
v. Rice, 12 W. Va. 575; Dunlap v.
Wisconsin:
Shanklin, 10 Id. 662.
Aultman v.Jett, 42 Wis. 488; Mlfatteson
v. Ellsworth, 33 Id. 488; Paine v.
v. Soper, 17 Kans. 369 ; Shepard v.
Allen, 16 Id. 182; lcCoy V'. Haslitt, Voeorhees, 26 Id. 522. These cases
Louisiana : Walton v. recognise the authority of Clark v.
14 Id. 430.
Mundal, 1 Salk. 124, in which Lord
Bemiss, 16 La. 140, 143. Maryland:
Haines v. Pearce, 41 At]. 221 ; Hoopes Chief Justice HOLT declared that " a
bill shall never go in discharge of a prev. Strasburger, 37 Id. 390. Michigan:
cedent debt, except it be parr of the conHot;
Gardner v. Gorham, 1 Doug. 507
tract that it should be so."
chihi v. Seeor, 8 Mich. 494. Minnesota:
In a recent case in Indiana, the disDaly v. Proetz, 20 Minu. 411 ; Goenen
is taken between a promissory
tinction
v. Schroeder, 18 Id. 66 ; McArdle v.
31lcArdle, 12 Id. 98 ; Kegugh v. ffcNitt, note negotiable by the law merchant,
and one not negotiable. And it is held
6 Id. 513. Mississislpi : Wadlington v.
Covert, 51 Miss. 631 ; aion v. Doherty, that if the note was negotiable, its exe43 Id. 553, 554. Missouri: Leabo v. cution and delivery must-be regarded as
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a payment of the prior debt, unless there
was an agreement to the contrary. If it
was not negotiable, it is not to be regarded as payment unless so agreed :
Krutsinger v. Brown, 12 Reporter 395.
In New York, while the rule is that the
note of a third person is nbt to be considered as payment unless ro agreed between the parties (Board of Education
v. Fonda, 77 N. Y. 350, 362), yet if the
creditor receives the debtor's own paper,
it cannot be regarded as payment of the
pre-dxisting debt, although it was expressly agreed that it should be so considered. The reason given for this distinction being that, in the latter case,
there is no consideration to support such
a promise: Frisbie v. Lamed, 21 Wend.
452; Cole v. Sackett, I Hill 516 ; Waydell v. Luer, 5 Id. 449 ; s. c. 3 1)enio
410 ; Rice v. Dm-ey, 54 Barb. 455.
On the other hand, in Maine, Massachusetts and in Vermont, the courts repudiating the rule, elsewhere so generally recognised, have always held to the
theory that a note of the debtor or of a
third person, is to be considered as
having been taken in payment of a
pre-existing indebtedness, unless otherwise agreed upon. In the absence of
agreement to the contrary, it is prima
facie payment of the indebtedness.
Maine: Strang v. trst, 61 Me. 9;
Paine v. Dwinel, 53 Id. 53; Gooding v.
31organ, 37 Id. 419 ; Desadillas v.
Harris, 8 Id. 298 ; Varner v. NMobleborough, 2 Id. 121.
Massachusetts:
Thacher v. bintwre, 5 Mass. 299;
Alaneely v. McGee, 6 Id. 143 ; Geodenow
v. Tyler, 7 Id. 36, 45 ; .Johnsonv..ohn.
son, 11 Id. 359, 362; fowler v. Bush,
21 Pick. 230; Ely v. .jhanes, 123 Mass.
36. Vermont: Rutchins v. Olcutt, 4
Vt. 549 ; Torreyv. Baxter, 13 Id. 452 ;
Fairr v. Stevens, 26 Id. 299 ; Collamer
v. Langdon, 29 Id. 32 ; Wait v. Brwster, 31 Id. 516.
But the presumption of payment is
not'applicable in the case of non-negotiable notes : Dutton v. Kendick, 12 Me. "

381; Edmond v. Caldwell, 15 Id. 340;
Bartlett v. illayo, 33 Id. 518; Greenwood v. Curtis, 4 Mass. 93 ; Howland v.
Coffin, 9 Pick. 54.
It is to be noted, too, that it is held the
if a negotiable note is given in a foreign
state, it will not be considered as having
been received in payment of the original
indebtedness, unless such was its effect
in the state or country where it was
given: Dascadillas v. Baris, 8 Me.
298. And if the negotiable paper received is not binding on all the parties
previously liable, it is said that the presumption of payment may be considered
as repelled : Fowler v. Ludwig, 34 Id.
455. So, where an unaccepted bill of
exchange is received, it is not considered
as having been received in payment:
Strang v. Hirst, 61 Id. 9. And in a
late case in Vermont, it is held that although the reception of negotiable paper
isprimafaciepayment, it is not payment
in the sense of extinguishing the creditor's claim upon collateral securities
given for the original debt, unless it was
so agreed: Pinney v. Kimpton, 46 Vt.
80.
It is worthy of remark, that in Aultman v. Jett, 42 Wis. 488, Mr. Chief
Justice RYA.,, a very able jurist, considered it the better rule to hold that the
taking of a negotiable note should be
considered as prima facie payment, although acquiescing in the contrary theory
upon the principle of stare decisis. And
it must be conceded that the reason given
by Chief Justice SnAw in Massachusetts, for the rule there maintained is not
without force. That reason was that
it was equally convenient to the creditor
to sue on the note as on tile original consideration, so that there was no reason
for considering the original simple contract as still in force. That, therefore,
a presumption arose that it was intended
the note should be deemed a satisfaction
of the original debt:, See his opinion in
Curtis v. Hubbard, 9 Met. 323. The
recent- decision of the Supreme Court
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of Indiana iii Krutsinger v. Brown,
supra, seems to bring the courts of that
state into line with those of Maine,
Massachusetts and Vermont on this subject.
It is agreed upon all hands that fraudulent or forged negotiable paper will not
be allowed to have the effect of payment,
although it was originally received as
payment. The fiaud practised vitiates
the agreement of the parties to treat it
as payment, or the presumption of the
law that it was intended to be received
as payment. This is the rule in England and America: Stedman v. Gooch,
I Esp. 3 ; Scholefield v. Templer, 4 D
Gex & J. 429 ; Ritter v. Singrnaster, 73
Penn. St. 400; Emerine v. O'Brien, 36
Ohio St. 491, 496 ; Hutchins v. Olcutt,
4 Vt. 549 ; Wemet v. Missisquoi Lime
Co., 46 Id. 458; Wait v. Brewster, 31
Id. 516.
It is also agreed, even in those states
where the delivery of a promissory note
is not payment unless so agreed, that
where a bond is given for a contract
debt, the debt is thereby extinguished,
the former being a higher security than
the latter: McAfcaughtn v. Partridge,
II Ohio, 223, 232; Bank of Missouri
v. Tesson, 1 Mo. 617 ; Vaughn v. Lynn,
9 Id. 770; Settle v. Davidson, 7 Id.
604; Hall v. Hoj;iins, 14 Id. 450.
If, instead of being taken as payment
the negotiable paper is transferred as
conditional payment, or as collateral se- eurity for an existing debt, a subsequent
recovery on such debt will depend on
the fact whether or not any laches has
been committed with regard to the
transferred security. And it has been
held that, where a draft drawn by a
third person is endorsed by the debtor,
and by him sent to the creditor, to be
applied when paid, the creditor cannot
sue on the original debt if he neglects
to take the necessary steps to hold the
debtor liable as endorser : Jennison v.
Parker, 7 Mich. 355. See too, Dayton
v. Trull, 23 Wend. 345 ; Todbey v. Bar-

ber, 5 Johns. 68 ; Snith v. Wilson, An.
draws 187, 228; Chamberlyn v. Delarive, 2 Wils. 353 ; Ward v. Evans, 2
Ld. Raym. 928. Where one receives a
draft as conditional payment, the duty
devolves on the creditor of doing everything whichis necessary to fix the liability of the parties: Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
AlIen, 11 Mich. 501 ; Briggs v. Persons,
39 Id. 400. And the rule is, that if
the creditor receives a note or bill as
collateral, and loss occurs through his
Inches, he must make it good: Lee v.
Baldwin, 10 Ga. 208 ; Trotter v. Crockett, 2 Porter 401 ; Powell v. Henry, 27
Ala. 612; Russell v. Hester, 10 Id.
535; Darnall v. 3Morehouse, 45 N. Y.
65 ; Whitin v. Paul (Supreme Court
of Rhode Island), 11 Reporter 316 ;
Wakeman v. Gowdy, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.)
208; Hoard v. Garner, 10 N. Y. 261;
Slerin v. lorrow, 4 Ind. 425; Lamberton v. Windom, 12 Minn. 232; Lyon
v. Huntingdon Bank, 12 S. & R. 61;
Williams v. Price, I Sim. & Stu. 581;
Ex parte lnare, 2 Cox 63. See Kiser
v. Ruddick, 8 Blackf. 384; Lawrence v.
MlcCalmont, 2 How. 426. It is his duty
to make demand of payment and to
give notice of dishonor: Wadlington
v. Covert, 51 Miss. 631, 636. But it is
not necessary that he should sue on it:
Kenimril v. Wilson, 4 Wash. C. C. 308;
309 ; Ripley
Archibald v. Argall, 53 Ill.
v. Greenleaf, 2 Vt. 129: Bank of Penna.
v. Potius, 10 Watts 148; Wadlington v.
Covert, supra. In a recent case in the
United .States Circuit Court (W. D. of
Tennessee), where an insurance company
bad taken a draft in payment of the premium, and the policy contained a condition thatt it should be void if the draft
was not paid-when due," without notice
to any party or parties interested
therein," it was held that the company
was nevertheless bound to comply with
the rules of commercial law as to negotiable paper, as to presentation and payment: Pendleton v. Knickerbocker Lije
But it is
Ins. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 169.
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said tbat'proof of due diligence is not
necessary if fraud was practised on the
creditor by false representations as to
the solvency of the maker, &c. : Lake
v. Gilchrist, 7 Ala. 955 ; Harton v.
Scales, Minor 166 ; N"ance v. Pope, 1
Stewart 220 ; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5
Conn. 74.
It seems to be agreed that, if a note
of a third person is taken in absolute
payment of a prp-existing debt, it is
taken free from equities: iMayberry v.
Morris, 62 Ala. 113; Barney v. Earle,
13 Id. 106 ; Bank of Mobile v. Hall,
6 Id. 639; Bertrand v. Barkinan, 13
Ark. 150; Bank of Republic v. Carrinyton, 5 R. 1. 515 ; Cobb v. Doyle, 7
Id. 550; May v. Quimby, 3 Bush (Ky.)
96 ; Cecil Bank v. Heald, 25 Md. 563;
Willians v. Little, 1 N. H. 66 ; Kingsland v. Pryor, 33 Ohio St. 19 ; Reddick
v. Jones, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 109; Outhwite
v. Porter, 13 Mich. 533 ; Walker v.
Geissee, 4 Whart. 252, 258; Bardsley
v. Delp, 88 Penn. St. 420; Knox v.
Ctl(Fford, 38 Wis. 651 ; Atkinson v.
Brooks, 26 Vt. 574; Russell v. Splater,
47 Id. 273; .Emanuel v.
Vhite, 34
Miss. 56; Stevenson v. Heyland, 11
Minn. 198; Conklin v. Vail, 31 Ill.
166;. Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Alle
236; Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cash.
162; Brush v. Scribner, 1l Conn. 388,
403; Bond v. Central Bank, 2 Kelly
(Ga.) 92 ; Swftt v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1 ;
Broun v. Leavitt, 31 N. Y. 113; Allaire v. Hartshorne, 21 N. 3. L. 665.
But a difference of opinion exists where
the note is taken as security for a preexisting debt. It has been held in some
cases that the holder takes free from
equities when he receives the paper
-under such circumstances: Goodman v.
Simonds, 20 How. 343; Oates v. N.ational Bank, 100 U. S. 239 ; Gibson v.
Conner, 3 Kelly 47; Meadow v. Bird,
22 Ga. 246; Exchange Bank v. Butner,
60 Id, 654; Best v. Crall, 23 Kans.
484; Succession af Dolhonde, 21 La.
.Ann- 3; Louisiana State Bank v.
VoL.'
.- 66
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Gaiennie, 21 Id. 555; Giovanovich v.
Citizens' Bank, 26 Id. 15; Sackett v.
Johnson, 54 Cal. 107 ; Davis v. Russell,
52 Id. 611; Frey v. Clifford, 44 Id.
342; Cobb v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 550; Allaire v. Hartshorne, supra. On the
other hand there are many cases maintaining a contrary theory, among which
may be cited the following: Royer v.
K'eystone Bank, 83 Penn. St. 248; Lenheim v. Wilmarding, 55 Id. 73; Kirkpatrick _v. Muirhead, 16 Id. 117, 123 ;
Petriev. Clark, 11 S.&R. 377; Body v.
Jewsen, 33 Wis. 402: Bowman v. Van
K'uren, 29 Id. 209 ; Jenkins v. Sclaub,
14 Id. 1 ; Prentice v. Zane, 2 Gratt.
262 ; Bramhall v. Beckett, 31 Mle. 205
Brooks v. Whitson, 7 S. '& 3K. 513;
Roxborough v. Messiek, 6 Ohio St. 448;
Alexander v. Springfield Bank, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 534; Boyd Y. Beck, 29 Ala.
703, 713; Fenonille v. Hamilton, 35 Id.
319 ; Andrews v. jMcCoy, 8 Id. 926;
Bertrand v. Barkman, 13 Ark. 150;
Rice v. Raitt, 17 N. H. 116; Bank v.
Kent, 15 Id. 579 ; Stalker v. JMcDonald, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 93 ; Caddington v.
Bay, 20 Johns. 644; Jones v. Swan, 6
Wend. 589 ; Hart Y. Palmer, 12 Id.
523; Ruddick v. Lloyd, 15 Iowa 441 ;
Ryan v. Chew, 13 Id. 589. It is conceded, however, that if, instead of being
simply received as a security, the creditor has been induced thereby to promise
an extension of time, or to relinquish
some advantage, or, if a new consideration appears, then the paper is held free
from equities. See Washington Bank v.
Krum, 15 Iowa 53; Stotts v. Byers,
17 Id. 303; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn.
388. 403; Roxborough v. Jlessick, 6
Ohio St. 448 ; Alexander v. Springfield
Bank, 2 Met. (Ky.) 534; Griswold v.
Davis, 31 Vt. 390; Petrie v. Clark, 11
S. & R. 377, 388; Rosenberger v. Bitting, 15 Penn. St. 278
Bertrand v,
Barkman, 13 Ark. 150; Bowman v.
Millison, 58 Ill. 36 ; Paulette v. Brown,
40 Mo. 54; Park Bank v. Watson, 42
N. Y. 490. So where the collateral has
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been received at the time the original
debt was contracted, it is held free from
equities : Bowman v. VranKuren, 29
Wis. 219; Aunn v. M11cDonald, 1O
Watts 270 ; Griswold v. Davis, 31 Vt.
890 ; Logan v. Smith, 62 Mo. 458.
But where there are existing equities,
the holder of the collateral can only recover upon it to the extent of his origi-

nal debt, although if no equities existed
he would be permitted to recover the
full amount of the collateral, holding the
excess in trust for his original debtor:
Allaire v. Hartshorne, 21 N. J. L. 665;
Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 76; Bak
v. Hemingray, 84 Ohio St. 381 ; Chicopee Bank v. Chdpin, 8 Mlet. 40.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

Circuit Court, Southern Districtof New York.
ROSE v. STEPUENS AND CONDIT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.
In a suit by one injured by the explosion of a boiler, against the owner of the
boiler, whose servants were operating it, the mere fact of the explosion raises a
presumption of negligence on the part of the owner, even though he occupied no
contract relation to the party injured.
In such case the burden is upon the owner of the boiler to disprove negligence.

MOTION for a new trial.
This was an action by John 0. Rose against The Stephens and
Condit Transportation Company to.recover damages for personal
injuries caused by the explosion of a boiler. On the trial the following facts appeared. The defendant was the owner of the steamboat "Magenta," and in March 1878 leased her to D. D. Smith
and others for one month, at a specified rental, the lessors to appoint and pay the engineer, fireman and pilot, and the lessees to
appoint and pay the other officers and crew. The lessees used the
boat for transporting passengers between Ilaverstraw and New
York, and on one of the trips between these places, on March 28d
1878, the boiler exploded, injuring the plaintiff who was a passenger. It appeared that the explosion was caused by the corrosion
of the iron composing a sheet of the steam chimney. It also
appeared that the boiler had been built in 1878, that the shell of
the steam chimney had been thoroughly examined in May 1877,
when it was found in excellent condition ; that in June 1877 the
boat had been regularly inspected and licefised for a year.; that in
March.1878, before the boat was allowed to go out the engineer
went inside the boiler, and inside of the steam chimney as far as
he could and found no signs of decay, and that he did the same
thing the Sunday before the explosion, but that no other examina-.
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tion was made of the boiler or steam chimney in 1878. The court
charged the jury, inter alia,asfollows : "The plaintiff, upon this issue
of negligence, has relied to a considerable extent upon the presumption arising.from the fact of the explosion, and I have intimated
upon the trial and now instruct you that from the mere fact of an
explosion it is competent for you to infer as a proposition of fact
that there was negligence in the management of the boiler, or in
some defect in its condition, for otherwise a casualty would not have
occurred. * * * The law permits the jury to imply from the mere
fact of an explosion a presumption of negligence." The court further charged that this presumption must be "met and repelled by
the defendant by showing that it occurred from causes for which
the defendant was not responsible; that it arose from some of
those inscrutable causes from which accidents so frequently arise;
that it took place notwithstanding the exercise of all due care and
prudence on the defendant's part."
The verdict was for plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial.
hauncey Shaffer, for plaintiff.
Butler, Stillman

Hubbard,
H
for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WALLACE, D. J.-The plaintiff was injured by the explosion of
a steam-boiler which was being used by the defendant to propel a
vessel chartered by the defendant to others to be used for the transportation of passengers and freight. If the explosion resulted
either from the carelessness of the employees of the defendant in
charge of the boiler, or from the negligence of the defendant in
sending forth an unsafe and dangerous boiler to be used where human
life would be endangered if the boiler should explode, it is conceded
the defendant was liable. It is contended, however, that it was
error to instruct the jury that they might infer such negligence
from the fact of the explosioni; and it is argued that such a presumption only obtains when the defendant is under a contract
obligation to the plaintiff, as in the case of a common carrier' or
bailee. Undoubtedly the presumption has been more frequently
applied in cases against carriers of passengers than in any other
class, but there is no foundation in authority or in reason for ay
such limitation of the rule of evidence. The presumption originates
from the nature of the act, not from the nature of the relations
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between the parties. It is indulged as a legitimate inference whenever the occurrence is such as, in the ordinary course of things,
does not take place when proper care is exercised, and is' one for
which the defendant is responsible. It will be sufficient to cite
two cases in illustration of the rule, without referring to other
authorities.
• In Scott v. London and St. Catherine Deck Co., 3 Hurlst. & 0.
596, the plaintiff, as he was passing by a warehouse of the defendant, was injured'by bags of sugar falling from a crane by which
they were lowered to the ground. The court said there must be
reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and
the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. This case is
cited, with approbation, in Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall.
129.
In Hullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, the plaintiff, who was
upon a street sidewalk, was injured by the fall of an unoccupied
building owned by defendant; and it was held that, from the hap7
pening of such an accident, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, negligence should be presumed and the burden cast upon
the owner to disprove it.
In the present case the boiler which exploded was in the control
of the employees of the defendant. As boilers do not usually explode when they are in a safe condition, and are properly managed,
the inference that this boiler was not in a safe condition, or was not
properly managed, was justifiable, and the instructions to the jury
were correct.
The other questions which are presented upon the motion are not
sufficiently serious to deserve extended ccmment. ' The instructions
to the jury must be considered in their integrity, and not in isolated parts, and so considered present the law of the case fairly and
correctly. The evidence amply justified the jury in the conclusion
that the defendant had not made such an examination of the boiler
as prudence required, preparatory to its employment for the season
of 1878, and which, if made, would have revealed the defect.
The verdict undoubtedly awarded the plaintiff liberal damages
for th6 injuries he sustained, but it is very difficult to measure the
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compensation which a party should receive for such acute suffering
as the plaintiff experienced. Certainly the verdict is not so obviously extravagant as to indicate prejudice or partiality. The motion
for a new trial is denied.
sound price for it, and that he repreTile damages caused by explosions
owe their origin mainly to three sources : sented it as sufficient. If they chose to
1. Steam boilers. 2. Blasting rocks. make his opinion the rule of their con3. Explosives and other dangerous sub- duct, in opposition to the evidence of their
own senses, they had no right to visit
stances. In the case of bursting of steam boil- the consequences of their folly upon their
customers."
ers, the accepted ground of liability is
The pith of this early Pennsylvania
actual negligence in the management of
the boiler. The Supreme Court of Penn- case was endorsed and extended in New
York in the noted case of Losee v. Basylvania first developed this idea. Tie
facts of the case in which the doctrine chanan, decided in 1873, by the Comwas thus asserted were these: A man mission of Appeals, 51 N. Y. 476 ;afdrove a horse to defendant's steam grist firming s. c. 42 How.Pr. 385 ; reversmill to get some grist which he had left to ing s. c. 61 Barb. 86. There EARL,
be ground, and he was thus lawfully upon C., delivering the opinion of the court
defendant's premises, and was just as said, in 'comparing the two cases: "I
am unable to see how that case differs in
much entitled to protection there as if
lie had been upon his own premises. principle from the one at bar. To sus(See for mention of this point Losee v. tain the broad claim of the plaintiff, it
While should have been held in that case that
Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476.)
there, the steam-boiler exploded and the owner of the steam-boiler was absokilled his horse, and the action was lutely liable, irrespective of any care,
brought for the value of the horse ; and skill or diligence on his part, for any
it was held that, to entitle the plaintiff damage which the boiler, by its exploto recovei-, lie was bound to show the sion, occasioned to any property lawfully
in the vicinity. Within the rules laid
want of ordinary skill and prudence:
down by these authorities (referring to the
Spencer v. Canpbell, 9 W. & S. 32.
This position is approved by Mr. Thomp- cases previously reviewed), the defendants in this case could not, without proof
son in his admirable work on Negligence (vol. 1, p. 112), in which he says of negligence, be madeliable for injuries
caused to the persons of those who were
of the view taken of the management
of the boiler: " Whether they had been near at the time of the explosion ; and
negligent in using it. was made to turn it would be quite illogical to hold them
on the question whether they had notice liable for injuries to property, while they
of its insufficiency, or, what was the were not liable for injuries to persons by
same thing, whether the circumstances
the same accident.
were such that they were bound to know
The action in which this view was
it; and it was ruled, with obvious pro- expressed, was brought to recover dampriety under the circumstances, that they ages occasioned by the explosion of a
could not shelter themselves from res- steam-boiler at the mill of the Saratoga
ponsibility under the plea that they were Paper Company. The fragments were
unacquainted with such machinery; that projected and thrown on to the plaintiff's
they applied to a competent and good premises and through several of his
machinist for the machine, paid him a buildings, thereby injuring and damag-
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ing the same and destroying personal
property therein. Besides the company,
other parties were made defendants,
some on the groumid that they were trustees, stockholders and agents of the corporation, and superintending its business
as such, and hence jointly liable with it;
others on the ground that they were the
manufacturers of the boiler, and made it
in such a negligent manner that the
boiler exploded.
Upon the first trial, tile presiding
judge dismissed the action as against the
defendants who manufactured the boiler,
and held that the other defendants
were liable irrespective of negligence,
excluding all to show that they were not
guilty of negligence.
For this error,
upon appeal to tile general term, tile
judgment was reversed and new trial
granted, the court holding that the defendants could be made liable only by
proof against them of negligence. Upon
the second trial, the presiding judge held
in accordance with the law as thus laid
down by the General Term, and upon the
question of negligence, the jury decided
against tile Saratoga Paper Company,
and in favbr of the other defendants.
The plaintiff claimed, as he did upon the
first trial, that the defendants were liable
without the proof of any negligence, and
requested the justice so to rule ; and the
refusal of the justice so to rule raised the
principal question considered on the final
appeal. Tie claim on the part of the
plaintiff aAs, that the casting of the
boiler upon the premises by'the explosion
was a direct trespass upon his right to
the undisturbed possession and occupation of his premises, and that the defendants were liable, just as they would have
been for any other wrongful entry and
trespass upon his premises.
The opinion in the case combated this
position and exhaustively reviewed the
pertinent authorities. It was shown that
the eases where there was liability for the
act of interference itself, irrespective of
negligence, wer e few in number and sub-

ject to important exceptions. Thus the
removal of the support of adjoining soil
was an infringement of the natural light
of lateral support (Farrandv. Marshall,
21 Barb. 409) ; bat this rule must undoubtedly be somewhat modified in its
application to cities and villages (Radcliff's Executorsv. Mayor, 4w., of Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 203). Blasting of rocks
and thereby injuring the adjacent freehold, is a ground for liability, though no negligence or want of skill was shown,
for the damage was the necessary and
immediate consequence of the act done
(Hay v. The Cohoes Company, 2 Comst.
159).
This, however, was far from an
authorityfor holding that the defendants,
who placed a steam-boiler upon their
lanlds and operated the same with care
and skill, should be liable for the damages caused by the explosionwithout their
fault or any direct or immediate act of
theirs. The subject of interference with
the natural flow of water, to the prejudice of another riparian owner, was discussed (as considered in the cases of
Bellinger v. The New York CentralBailroad Co., 23 N. Y. 47 ; Pixley v. Clark,
35 Id. 520, and Selden v. The Delaware
and Hudson ('anal Co., 24 Barb. 362),
and the conclusion reached that liability
was incurred, as by a nuisance, irrespective of negligence, unless the injurious
work was done pursuant to legislative
authority. So it had been held that a
party had no right to operate a steamengine and other machinery upon his
premises so as to cause the vibration and
shaking of plaintiff's adjoining buildings
to such an extent as to endanger and inMcKeon v. See, 4 Robt.
jure them.
459, affirmed, 51 N. Y. 300. But this
case was decided upon the law of nuisance. The decision in this case and in
scores of similar ones to be found in the
books, was far from an authority that
one should be held liable for the accidental explosion of a steam-boiler, which
was in no sense a nuisance.
After distinguishing the law as to wild
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animals and trespass upon land, the de-

cision continues ; "So, too, the general
rules thit I may have the exclusive and
undisturbed use and possession of my
real estate, and that I must so use my
real estate as not to injure my neighbor,
are much modified by the exigencies of the
social state. We must have factories,
machinery, dams, canals and railroads.
They are demanded by the minifold
wants of mankind, and lay at the basis
of all our civilization. If I have any
of these upon my lands, and they are
not a nuisance, and are not so managed
as to become such, I am not responsible
for any damage they accidentally and
unavoidably do my neighbor. He receives his compensation by the general
good in which le shares, and the right
which le has to place the same things
upon his lands."
The opinion admitted that a contrary
view has been entertained in England,
where the construction of a reservoir
which flooded adjacent mines, was regarded as creating liability for the
damage so caused, though the defendants
were not personally guilty of any negligence; upon the broad ground that one
who, for his own purposes, brings upon
his land, and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if
he does not do so, is primnafacie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. This
was ruled in Fletcher v. Rylands, Law
Rep., 1 Exch. 265, affirmed Law Rep.,
3 1H.L. 330 ; and followed in Smith v.
F.etcder, Law Rep., 7 Exch. 305. But
it was in direct conflict with the law as
settled in this count-y in regard to milldams and reservoirs (Aug. on Watercourses, sect. 336 ; Lapham v. Curtis, 5
Vt. 371 ; Todd v. Cochell, 17 Cal. 97;
Everett v. Hydraulic, s-c., Co., 23 Id.
225; Shrewsbury v. Smith, 12 Cush.
177; Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow. 175 ;
Bailey v. The Mayor, 6-c., qf lNew Yorkj
3 Hill 531; s. c. 2 Denio 433; Pixley

v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520, 524; Sheldon
v. Sherman, 42 Id. 484). Opposed to
its position was also a class of cases in
reference to damage from fire communicated from adjoining premises (Clark-v.
Foot, 8 Johns. 422 ; Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, 11 Metc. 460; Rinds v. Barton,
25 N. Y. 544; Teall v. Barton, 40
Barb. 139; Cook v. The Champlain
Transportation Co., I Denio 91), from
which it appeared that negligence must
be shown. The same rule that a party
exercising adequate skill and care is free
from liability applied to injuries to the
person not designedly inflicted, but due
to inevitable accident (Dygert v. Bradley, 8 Wend. 469 ; Brown v. Kendall,
6 Cush. 292; Bizzell v. Booker, 16
Ark. 309).
The conclusion was, therefore, reached that the rule is, at least in
this country, a universal one, that no
one can be made liable for injuries to
the person or property of another without some fault or negligence on his part;
and hence that the defendants were not
liable for the damages caused by the
bursting of the steam-boiler on their
premises.
Concernipg this case and a parallel
one in New Jersey, it has been remarked: "The cases of Losee v. Buanan (cited supra) and Marshall v.
Welwood, -38 N. J. 1. 339, where
the same conclusion was reached upon
similar facts, undoubtedly proceed upon
the true ground. Steam has come into
such general use as a motive power,
not only in'the operations of commerce
and manufactures, but even in those of
agriculture, that a rule of law making
those who employ it insurers of the safety
of others against damages arising from
its use would not only be contrary to the
analogies of the law, but would impose
serious restraints upon the most necessary and beneficial industries. Both the
proprietor of machinery propelled by.
steam and the engineer in charge of §uch
machinery, have the strongest motives
for watching over its safety. The proL
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perty of the one and the life of the other
depend upon constant vigilance in this
regard. These motives will, ordinarily,
secure that degree of skill and attention
which the safety of the pablic demands,
without the aid of a rule making the
proprietor liable, in any event, for
damages resulting from an explosion :"
1 Thomp. Neg. 112.
larshall v. Welwood, referred to in
these comments, was decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1876.
BEASLEY, 0. J., there criticised the
English doctrine as to the bursting of
reservoirs, the principle of which, if accepted, would, lie declared, rule the case
before the court ; "for water is no more
likely to escape from a reservoir and do
damage, than steam from a boiler; and,
therefore, if he who collects the former
force upon his property, and seeks, with
care and skill, to keep it there, is answerable for his want of success, so is he
who, under similar 'circumstances, endeavors to deal with the latter. There
is nothing unlawful in introducing wate"
into a properly constructed reservoir on a
person's own land, nor ir raising steam
in a boiler of proper quality; neither act,
when performed, is a nuisance per se;
and the inquiry consequently is, whether
in the doing of such lawful acts the party
who does it is an insurer against all flaws
in the apparatus employed, no matter
how secret or unascertainable by the use
of every reasonable test, such flaws may
be."
After criticising the supposed
analogy of the escape of cattle and showing the cases concerning vaults out of repair and the fumes of alkali works to be
covered by the law of nuisances, it is
finally said : "If the steam-engine which
did the mischief in the present case had
been in use in driving a train of cars on
a railroad, and had in that situation exploded, and had inflicted injuries on
travellers or bystanders, it could not
have been pretended that such damage
was detionable, in the absence of the element of. negligence or "unskilfulness.

By changing the place of the accident to
private property, I cannot agree that a
different rule obtains."
A different rule, however, at least to
the extent of holding the explosion prima
face evidence of negligence, was adopted
in the principal case and also in Fay v.
Davidson, 13 Minn. 528. In both cases
tthe fact thatthe boiler of a steamboat exploded was regarded as of itself evidence
of negligence sufficient to render the owner of the boat liable for resulting injuries.
Of course, there were stronger grounds for
this view where a repealed federal statute provided that in such cases the fact
of the, bursting of the steamboat boiler
should be taken as full p~i-iafade evidence to charge the defendants or those
in his employment with negligence:
Afc.ahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357.
But the general current of authority is
as previously stated.
As to the parties liable for such explosions, we find note made of an. early
English case where a steam-boiler and
engine had been newly set up in a
b-ailding of a sugar refinery. The defendant and his servants (not the owners of the works) were experimenting with the apparatus with a view to
perfect a process for refining sugar.
While the boiler was then under the
management of these parties it exploded,
tearing down an adjacent building. The
disaster was due to mismanagement on
the part of the defendant's servants'and
to a defect in the materials of which the
boiler was composed. It was held that
the'owner of the adjacent building might
recover damages, that the action was
properly brought against the person in
charge of the boiler at the time of the
explosion, and that it was not necessary
to bring it against the owner of the
building in which the boiler was: Witte
v. Hague, 2 Dow. & By. 33; 1 Th.
Negligence 113. The New York Court
of Appeals has held that the manufacturer and vendor of a steam-boiler is not
liable to a person other than the vendee
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for damages occasioned by its exploding
in consequence of its having been defectively constructed : Losee v. Clute, 51
N. Y. 494. This opinion has been criticised (I Th. Neg. 233) as contrary to
previous authority in the same court
(Tomas v. Wrinchester, 6 N. Y. 397).
.The same commentator characterises it
as unsound in principle. The grounds
for this dissent are thus stated : " Steamboilers are highly dangerous, even when
properly constructed; but when defectively constructed, nothing is .more probable than that they will explode, and
that the explosion will kill or injure innocent persons and destroy adjacent property. The ignorant or unskilful construction of such a dangerous machine
is a degree of negligence approaching
the grade of crime; and damages ought,
it should seem, to be given in such cases
to any one who has sustained an injury
which a due regard for the lives and property of others would have prevented.21
To the same effect are remarks in Allen
v. Talbot, 6 Pac. C. L. J. 985, where
it is said : "The Acts of Congress recognise a steam-boiler as highly dangerous.
The Supreme Court of the United States
also recognises it as highly dangerous.
And it seems that a steam-boiler in
its nature is imminently dangerous-as
much so as a gun." The questions involved in this discussion pertain to dangerous articles generally, and will be
considered later.
In the case of personal injuries caused
by blasting of rocks, it has been laid
down that blasting rocks in a public
street, even in the prosecution of some
public work, is a dangerous nuisance,
for which an action lies by a person
thereby injured: Vare v. St. Paul Mater Co., I Dill. 465. But there have
been cases where recovery in such instances haif been denied, though not for

reasons which impair the force of the
statement just made. Thus there was
a failure to recover where an action was
brought against the city of New York to
VoL. XXX.-67
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obtain damages for the death of plaintiff's child, caused by employees of the
defendant blasting rocks in a street of
the city. It seems that a charge from
the blast threw a rock through a window
of the plaintiff's house, killing the child.
A judgment was rendered for the plaintiff; but merely on technical grounds;
and a subsequent judgment (reported in
8 N. Y. 222,) was rendered in favor of
the defendant, it being ruled that the
city was not liable because the blasting
was done by an independent contractor.
Regarding the proof of negligence in
such cases, the court of first resort in the
same state has held, where suit was
brought by a person injured by a blast,
that it will be primaface evidence of
negligence to show that the person engaged in blasting rocks failed to take
such precautions against accidents as
were required by the city ordinances:
Devlin v. Gallagher, 6 Daly 494. So
the highest tribunal in that jurisdiction
has passed upon the degree of care required to be exercised by a corporation
blasting rocks on its own land. It was
held evidence of negligence that no
warning that a blast was about to be
fired was given to persons passing by
over the land of the corporation; and
this was ruled although the blasting was
done in a quarry forty feet below the
surface of the ground with sand-blasts
which are not usually dangerous : Driscoll v. Newark, $-&c.,
Co., 37 N. Y. 637.
(As to the admissibility of the evidence
of practical miners as experts on the
quality of blasting powder, see Sowden
v. Idaho Quartz Mining Co., 55 Cal.
443.) It will be seen that though a high
degree of care is exacted from persons
engaged in blasting rocks, yet where
injuries to the person alone result, it is
not pretended that there is any liability
irrespective of negligence. This has
been ruled, however, where the consequent injury was done to the adjacent
freehold or possession of another. Thus
in Hay v. The Cohoes Co., 2 Comst.
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159, the defendant, a corporation, dug a Sabin v. Vermont, 6-c., Railroad Co., 25
canal upon its own ground for the pur- Vt. 363; Whitehouse v. Androscoggin
poses authorized by its charter. In so Railroad Co., 52 Me. 208. The last
doing, it was necessary to blast rocks case holds that tort will lie in such cases
with gunpowder, and the fragments for failure to remove loose stones
were thrown against and injured the scattered upon plaintiff's land. Replaintiff's dwelling, upon lands adjoin- garding the proof required where ining. It was held that the defendant was jury is done to houses or lands by
liable for the injury, although no negli- blasting rocks, and the parties to be
gence or want of skill in executing the sued, see Hardrop v. Gallagher, 2 E.
work, was alleged or proved. 1! This D. Smith 523; Gourdier v. Corinack, 2
decision," says the court in the before- Id. 200 ; Ulrich v. M3"cCabe, 1 'Hilt.
recited case of Lose *v. Buchanan, 51 251; 3lcCafferiy v. S'puyten Duyvil,
N. Y. 476, "was well supported by the 6-c., Railroad Co., 61 N. Y. 178;
clearest principles. The acts of the de- Brown v. Lent, 20 Vt. 529.
fendant in casting the rocks upon plainRegarding damages caused directly
tiff's premises were direct and immediate. by explosives, the leading decision is
The damage was the necessary conse- the celebrated nitro-glycerine case in the
quence of just what the defendant was Supreme Court of the United States
doing, and it was just as much liable as (Parrot v. Wells, Fargo 6- Co., 15
if it had caused the rocks to be taken by Wall. 524), which involved the liability
hand, or any other means, and thrown of a carrier of that destructive comdirectly upon plaintiff's land."1 Judge pound. A firm of express-carriers reGAnDnIst, in delivering the opinion, ceived and transported from New York
lays down broadly the principle that to San Francisco a package of nitro-gly" every individual is entitled to the uncerine, a substance then little known, in
disturbed possession and lawful enjoy- ignorance of the name and character of
ment of his own property," citing the its contents, and without negligence.
maxim sic utere tuo, &e. ; and this vivew The package having leaked on the voyhas been, as we have seen, criticised for age, it was examined when it was reoverlooking the exceptions to the rule. ceived at the carrier's warehouse in
Pursuant to this decision, it has been fur- San Francisco. An agent and servant
ther held by the same court that, evidence of the express company, together with a
of absence of negligence in such cases is in- representative of the steamship company
admissible, where there is no claim for ex- which had transported it for them, proemplary damages: Trenzain v. The Cohoes ceeded in tile usual manner, and in
Co., 2 N. Y. 163. The view that the ignorance of the character of the conexercise of ordinary care does not avoid tents of the package, to open it for the
liability in such eases, is also adopted in purpose of ascertaining the cause of the
Maryland : Scott v. Bay, S Md. 431. On leakage. While they were doing this,
the other hand, some of the New Eng- it exploded, killing all persons present,
land courts, take a diametrically opposite destroying the building in which it was,
position, and hold that such an invasion and greatly damaging other buildings.
of another's freehold by a railway com- It was held that the carriers were not
pany constructing its road, is not a tort liable to pay damages for the property
at all. But this is held because there thus destroyed, except as to that occuare statutes providing for compensation pied by them as tenants under a.leasc,
to landowners for all damages arising as to. which they admitted a liability as
from the building of such roads : Dodge for waste. It had been contended that
v. County Commissioners, 3 Mete. 380;
the defendants were chargeable with
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cargo in contact with it. Finally, the
case before the court was regarded as
and of the proper mode of handling and one of unavoidable accident, for the consequences of which the defendants were
dealing with it, and were consequently
guilty of negligence in receiving, intro- not responsible. The shipper of danducing and handling the box containing gerous articles is, however, liable where
the nitro-glycerine. But Justice FIELD,
they explode and cause injury, if lie lis
who delivered the opinion of the court, not taken proper care to prevent their
said : "If
express-carriers are thus
delivery without notice of their character.
chargeable with notice of the contents
This is illustrated by the case where two
of packages carried by them, they must
substances, prepared by diffirent manuhave the right to refuse to receive pack- facturers, which were generally used
ages offered for carriage without knowl- together, were dangerousl. t explosive
edge of their contents.
It would, in
in combination. A customer sent sepathat case, be unreasonable to require
rate orders to each manufacturer for
them to accept, as conclusive in every quantities of the respective substances,
instance, the information given by the to be forwarded to him by a certain
owner. They must be at liberty, when- common carrier.
He further directed
ever in doubt, to require, for their
one of the manufacturers to make the
satisfaction, an inspection even of the substance which he was to furnish of
contents, as a condition of carrying the greater explosive power than usual.
packages. This doctrine would be at- The orders were filled, and the subtended, in practice, with great inconstances delivered in apparently harmless
venience, and would seldom lead to any
packages to the carrier, by the manugood.
Fortunately the law is not so
facturers. Each of the latter acted
unreasonable. It does not exact any independently of the other, and was
such knowledge on the part of the car- ignorant of the other's proceedings ; and
rier, nor permit him, in cases free from
no notice was given to the carrier of the
suspicion, to require information as to
nature of either of the substances, or
the contents of.the packages offered, as a
their character in combination. The
condition of carrying them."
To this
carrier stowed them together in his veeffect are cited Grouch v. London 4 North- hicle, and while lie was transporting
Western Railway Co., 14 C. B. 291,
them with due care, they exploded, and
and Brass v. Maitland, 6 El. & El. 485.
injured his property, and property of
The opinion then proceeds: "The de- others in his custody. Property of a
fendants, being ignorant of the contents third person, near which the vehicle was
of the case, received in the regular
standing, was also injured. The excourse of their business, were not guilty plosion was practically a single one, and
of negligence in introducing it into it was impossible to distinguish how
their place of business, and handling it
much of the damage was produced by
in the same manner as other packages
either substance. It was ruled that the
of similar outward appearance were manufacturers, but not 'the customer,
usually handled."
An illustration of a
were jointly liable in tort to the carrier
confirmatory character was taken from
and the third person: Boston, 4-c., Railthe case of Pierce v. Winsor, 2 Cliff. 18,
road Co. v. Shanly, 107 Mass. 568.
where the charterer of a ship was held
Again, the manufacturers of a safetyfuse have been declared to be liable for
not liable for the results of taking
nastic, au article new in commerce, as personal injuries, including the loss of
freight, though it was so affected by the his eyesight, sustained by plaintiff while
voyage that it injured other parts of the
blasting for a tunnel. As foreman of a
notice of the character and properties
of the merchandise in their possession,
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gang of men, plaintiff, having set the
blast (according to his statement) lighted
the fuse with a lighted candle, and
walked towards the mouth of the tunnel
where the men were standing. Seventeen minutes later he walked to the
blast, aud neither seeing nor smelling
any smoke, concluded the fuse had gone
out, and reached forward to remove the
fuse and replace it with another piece,
and just then the explosion took place,
causing the severe injuries complained
of" It was ruled that the plaintiff could
not recover, because he was guilty of
contributory negligence, as shown partly
by his own admissions, and partly from
the testimony-of experts. They agreed
that it is impossible for a fuse to burn and
hang fire for seventeen minutes. The
hole dug in this case was like the bore
of a gun, and the charge was put into
it, not for the purpose of producing the
final blast, but for the purpose of
"chambering it," or enlarging the bottom of the hole so as to put in a large
charge of black powder. The experts
testified that the blast in such a hole will
shoot out like a charge from a gun, and
if the plaintiff had approached it in a
careful and proper manner, had taken
another charge and dropped it in, he
could not have received the injury.
They said he must have had his face
over the hole, for lie could not have been
thus injured if he had kept his face away
from the line or axis of the hole. For
these reasons the plaintiff failed to recover; but the liability the manufacturers would otherwise have incurred
was fully shown: Allen v. Talbot, 6
Pac. Coast L. J. 980. It was declared that if an article manufactured
is, by its nature, imminently dangerous,
and the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the manufacturer's
neglect and failure to use due skill and
care, the manufacturers are liable to any
person injured by the same. It was
further laid down that although blasting
fuse is not of itself an explosive, yet it

is always used in connection with some
dangerous explosive. Hence the law
imposes upon the manufacturer a duty
to the public to manufacture it with due
skill and care, and if lie neglects to do
so he is liable to anyone injured through
his negligence. The form in which this
conclusion was stated, was this: that a
manufacturer of any article imminently
dangerous to human life, to wit, fuse,
nitro-glycerine, dynamite, gunpowder,
giant powder, and other explosives,
steam-boilers, guns and torpedoes, owes
a duty to the public to exercise that
care, skill, prudence and diligence in
the manufacturing thereof, which a good
business man, skilled in the manufacturing thereof-which an expert in that
business-is accustomed to use, and is
not liable as an insurer : Allen v. Talbot, supra.
The plaintiff in the case just cited was
working under the direction of railway
contractors, to whom the fuse had been.
sold by defendant's agent. The questions involved, therefore, also included
the liability for selling dangerous articles.
On this point it was claimed that the
fuse was warranted by the manufacturers. But it was held that defendants
were liable, for any breach of such warranty, only to persons directly interested
in the contract of sale. This was ruled
upon the principle that, the mmuufaeturer
of an article is ordinarily liable only to
the vendee, for any defect therein, and
then only by virtue of the contract. He
is not liable to third parties, not privy
to the sale, for injuries arising from
defect in the article, except he owes
them a duty, as in the case of an article
imminently dangerous. This distinction
was illustrated by the case of Loop v.
Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351. There the
defendants made and sold a cast-iron
balance-wheel, to be used vith a circular
saw. The wheel was defectively constructed. The wheel burst, a fragment
struck plaintiffs' intestate, who was
using the machine with the vendee's
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consent, and caused his death. It was
held, in an action for causing death by
negligence, that the plaintiffs could not
recover, although they tried to bring
their case within the principle above
stated (a principle which was also applied to deadly drugs, in Thonas v.
Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397), by asserting that tie fly-wlheel in question was
a dangerous instrument. But the court
said: "Poison is a dangerous instrunient. Gunpowder is the same. A
torpedo is a dangerous instrument, as
is a spring-gun, a loaded rifle, or the
like. They are instruments and articles
in their nature calculated to do injury
to mankind, and generally intended to
But the
accomplish that purpose."
object in controversy was regarded as
not possessing such attributes.
On the other hand, the principle of
the liability of the vendor of dangerous
articles, where the resulting explosions
injured the vendee, has been applied,
to sales of naphtha ( Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64),
and of gunpowder to a child (Carter v.
Torone, 98 Mass. 567). But see a later
judgment to the contrary in the same
case, on the ground that the gunpowder
had come into the custody of the child's
parents before it was fired, and that the
sale to the child was not the proximate
cause of the injury: 103 Mass. 507.
So, though on different grounds, the
vendor has been held liable in damages where he warranted a gun to *be
good and safe, where a father had purchased it to be used by himself and his
sons, and it exploded while one of the
sons was using it, in consequence of
its defective construction : Langridge
v. Levyl, 2 Al. & W. 519, affirmed 4
The responsibility of the
Id. 337.
vendor was placed upon the ground of
his direct warranty, and his knowledge
of the purpose for which the gun was
to be used, and it is this feature of
the case which may he regarded as distinguishing it from the safety-fuse case.
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The further limitations of the doctrine
occur when the acts of a third party
intervene to produce the explosion.
Among the instances given is that,
where the defendants who were druggists
and chemists, ignorantly sold sulphide of
antimony as black oxide of manganese,
and the vendees resold it as the latter
to the plaintiff, who, under the same
belief, mixed it with chlorate of potassia.
In this way a dangerous and explosive
substance was created, which exploded,
damaging the plaintiff. But the defendants were held not liable, because it was
not shown that there was any duty or
obligation resting on the defendants
toward the plaintiff in the sale to his
vendors : Davidson v. NVichols, 11 Allen
514.
As for explosions caused by escape of
gas or its mismanagement, the liability
of the companies which manufacture and
sell this highly explosive agent is based
upon negligence.
The doctrines of
contributory or intervening negligence,
therefore, play an important part in
determining upon whom the resulting
injury is to be blamed. See Lannen v.
Albany Gas Co., 44 N. Y. 459; Burrows v. M1arch GasQ 4 Coke Co., Law
Rep., 5 Exch. 67, affirmed Law Rep., 7
Exeh. 96; Lanigan v. New York GasLight Co., 71 N. Y. 29 ; Holly v. Boston
Gas-Light Co., 8 Gray 123; Flint v.
Gloucester Gas-Light Co., 3 Allen 343;
s. c. 9 Id. 552 ; Bartlett v. Boston GasLight Co., 117 Alass. 533; s. c. 122
Id. 209 ; Kiminell v. Burfeind, 2 Daly
155. As to the duty of a gas company
in case of an extensive conflagration in
a city, see Hutchinson v. Boston GasLight Co., 122 Mass. 219.
The latest decitions on the subject of
gas explosions are both by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and present
features of more than ordinary interest.
The first of these is the case of the Oil
City Gas Co. v. Robinson, 13 Reporter
253, decided November 7th 1881. It
was therein held that a gas company
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which neglects to repair a defective pipe
whence gas escapes into a sewer, causing an explosion therein, is liable for
the damage caused by the explosion.
But on the other hand it was ruled that
the civil engineer of the city was guilty
of contributory negligence and could not
recover, as lie smelt the illuminating gas
in the sewer, and nevertheless entered
with an exposed light, whereupon the
explosion took place.
Tile other and later case, decided
January 16th 1882, was that of Strawbridge v. City of Pdladlpia, 13 Reporter 216. The city which was sued,
manufactured and distributed its own
illuminating gas. It was held not to be
responsible irrespective of negligence,
for injuries to adjacent property caused

by an explosion ; as the business which
the city carried on was not a nuisance in
itself, or in the mode of its management.
But it was furthermore again ruled, that
the plaintiff, a storekeeper, was to be
regarded as having contributed to the
injury, and could not recover therefor.
The ground for this position was, that
he had illegally, and for his own purposes, made an excavation under the
street in front of his own premises,
thereby removing the earth which before
stood between said premises and a gas
main in said street, aud that the gas had
thus escaped, penetrated the premises,
and exploded.
A. DO.xT.
San Francisco.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
MISSISSIPPI MILLS v. UNION AND PLANTERS' BANK OF
MEMPHIS.
The vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is not defeated by the levy of an attachment upon the goods as the property of the vendee, at the instance of his creditor,
while the goods remain in the hands of the carrier after the termination of the transit, but before a reasonable time has elapsed for delivery to the vendee.
A. received an order from B. to ship goods, but immediately received another
message not to ship before -a certain date. By mistake the second message was disregarded and the goods shipped immediately. They arrived at the railroad depot at
which B. was to receive them but were not taken possession of by B., and while
there were attached by B.'s creditors. A. learning that B. was insolvent ordered
the goods to be stopped and replevied them : Held, that A. was entitled to the goods
as against the attaching creditors.
(Boyd v. Mosely, 2 Swan 660, distinguished, and the contrary doctrine of that
case held to be obiterdicturz.)

RnmLvwi by a vendor claiming to exercise a right of stoppage
in transitu against a creditor of the vendee who had attached the
goods in the hands of the carrier.
The case was tried by the judge without a jury, the parties having agreed upon the facts which were in substance as follows:
Sometime prior to January I 6th 1880, plaintiff sold to Williford
& Anderson, merchants at Bartlett, Tennessee, on a credit of
sixty days, four coils of rope and one bale of cottonades, of the
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value of $150. Plaintiffs then supposed Williford & Anderson
to be solvent. Before the goods had been shipped plaintiffs received from Williford & Anderson a postal card, dated January
16th 1880, requesting that the goods should not be sent until February 1st. By inadvertence plaintiffs shipped the goods by rail on
January 20th, and they arrived at the depot at Bartlett on January 29th. Meanwhile, on January 27th, Williford & Anderson
being insolvent had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
At that time they were indebted in the sum of $237.75 to the defendant bank which, on January 29th 1880, issued an attachment
which was on January 80th levied on the said goods. Subsequently
judgment was rendered in favor of the bank in the attachment
At the time of the attachment the
proceedings for $237.75.
goods were still in the depot at Bartlett, not having been taken
possession of by Williford & Anderson. On February 2d 1880,
plaintiffs, having been notified by telegram from Williford &Anderson of the assignment, endeavored to stop the goods in transituand
being resisted in this by the attaching creditor replevied the goods
on February 4th 1880. It further appeared that the railroad agent
was not in the habit of notifying consignees of the arrival of goods.
Upon these facts the court gave, judgment for defendant and
plaintiff appealed.
B. . Kimbrough-, for plaintiff.
J. I. G-reer, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DEADERICK, 0. J.-The controlling question in the case is,
"had plaintiff, upon the facts admitted, lost the right of stoppage
in transitu."
Itis insisted for defendants that admitting there was no actual
possession of the goods by Williford & Anderson, still the levy of
the attachment terminated such right; and the case of Boyd v.
A'fosely, 2 Swan 661, is relied upon to sustain this position.
By an examination of the 2 Swan case, it will appear that it
was not a case raising the question of the right of stoppage in
transitu, and is therefore a mere dictum, as correctly said by Mr.
King in his Digest, vol. 3, sect. 5188, sub. sect. 4.
This right of stoppage in transitu arises solely upon the insol-
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vency of the buyer : Benj. on Sales, sect. 828, 837. It does not
exist against a solvent purchaser.
In the 2 Swan case it was correctly held by this court, where
goods were ordered And placed on the wagon of a common carrier, directed to the purchaser in accordance with his directions,
that the delivery to the carrier was a delivery to the buyer, and
the property vested in him, and might be legally attached for his,
the buyer's, debts. The seller had replevied the goods, and his
claim was urged upon the grohinds, 1. That the delivery was not
complete. 2. That he had a lien upon the goods until the price
was paid.
Both these claims were decided adversely to him, and his honor,
Judge TOTTEN, proceeded to say: "By this delivery (to the
carrier) the property becomes vested in the buyer, subject only to
the seller's right of stoppage in transitu, which is an equitable
right not inconsistent with the former; it consists in reserving the
possession of the goods while in transitu,and retaining them until
the price be paid."
"But," he adds, "this right is gone if other lonafide rights
intervene before it be exercised; as if the buyer sell the goods, or
they be legally attached for debt; as in the present case."
There is not only no statement in the opinion in that case' that
the buyer was insolvent, but it is stated that plaintiff had "full con-:
fidence in the credit and solvency of the buyer." The case was
therefore wanting in the element f insolvency of the buyer to
bring it within the principles of law conferring upon the vendor
the right of stoppage in transitu. But as before stated, the case
was correctly decided upon the ground that the sale and delivery
to the carrier wa s a delivery to the buyer: Ang. on Carriers 497;
Benj. on Sales, sects. 3, 308, 675, 840.
But if the goods have not gone into the actual possession of the
buyer, and he has not made a bova fide sale of them, and he be
insolvent, the seller may reclaim them for his own indemnity:
Benj. on Sales, sects. 675, 677, 840; 5 Wait's Actions and
Defences 611. And this right of reclamation he may exercise,
notwithstanding the goods have been seized in execution, or by
attachment, by creditors of the buyer: Benj. on Sales, sects. 832,
836; 5 Wait's Actions and Defences 616; 50 Miss. 590.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the circuit
judge was erroneous, and it will be reversed. The same result
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would probably follow upon the further ground that the goods were
ordered not to be sent before February 1st, and were sent without
the consent of Williford &-Anderson at an earlier date, and they
were not bound then to receive them.
The property in question having been delivered to plaintiff on his
writ of replevin, he will take his judgment here for costs.
On the same principle, the levy of
an execution will not defeat the vendor's
right: Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend.
going case. It does not seem to have
been considered an open question. The 611. De Chaumwnt v. Griffin, cited by
Bnoesox, J., in Buckley v. Furniss, 15
general proposition has been frequently
Wend. 144.
stated that the assignment of the bill of
All these cases evidently proceed on
lading by the consignee or vendee of
the general doctrine applicable to cases
the goods is the only way of defeating
the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. of stoppage, which was laid down by
Chief J. SHAW, in Stanton v. Eager,
Judge REDrIELD, in a note to his work
on Carriers, says, " We are not aware 16 Pick. 467, namely, that a purchaser
from the consignees before final and actual
that the right can be defeated in anpy
other mode, until the goods come to the delivery, takes "1a title to the goods,
(P.
subject to the right of tie vendor to stop
virtual possession of the vendee."
the goods in transitu." It is frequently
189.)
Mi. Benjamin, in his treatise on
stated by the courts as the settled docSales, says this right "is defeasible in
one way only."' (Sect. 862.) Mr. Per- trine in cases of stoppage, that a third
party can acquire no better right to the
kins, the American editor of Benjamin,
inserts at this point a note referring to goods than the consignee himself possessed, unless he have "anassignment of
American cases, which hold the doctrine
the bill of lading. So the carrier can
of the principal case.
It was held in England thtit the not defeat the vendor's right by setting
up a lien for a general balance due him
vendor's right of stoppage was not J,
from the vendee : Oppenhein v. Russell,
feated by an attachment of the goods as
3 Bos. & Pul. 42.
the property of the vendee, at the inThe doctrine-of the cases above cited
stance of his creditor: Smith v. Goss, 1
was carried still farther in O'Brien
Camp. 282 (1808.)
In America, the same doctrine has v. Norris, 16 Md. 122, where it was
been held in the following cases, which held that, even a sale of the goods in
are stated in their chronological order : invitum, under the attachment, did not
Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. 198 ; Hause defeat the stoppage right of tlhe vendor,
who was accordingly allowed to recover
v. Judson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 8; Hays v.
the proceeds of the sale.
3Afouille, 14 Penn. St. 48; Aguirre v.
Inasmuch as the vendor's right in
Purmelee, 22 Conn. 473 ; Cox v. Burns,
1 Clarke (Iowa) 64; Kitchen v. Spear, all such cases must be exercised in
transitu, it is pertinent to notice the
30 Vt. 545 ; Seymour v. Newton, 105
circumstances under which the adverse
M[ass. 272 ; Calahan v-. Babcock, 21
levies were effected in the cases above
Dhio St. 281 ; Morris v. Shryock, 50
cited. In Smith v. Goss, House v.
Miss. 590.
Judson, Hays v. .3ouille, Aguirre v.
Dicta to the same effect may be found
in N~ewhall v. Vargas, 15 Mc. 314, and Parmelee and Covell v. Hitchcock, the
goods were levied on at some intermeWood v. Yeatman. 15 B. Mon. 270.
VOL. XX.-68
The text-writers have not discussed
the question involved in the fore-
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diate port or station, before reaching the
terminus of the transit. In Naylor v.
Devine, they were still on board the
vessel. In Calahan v. Babcock, they
were attached after their arrival at the
railroad depot, and before the consignee
had exercised acts of ownership; the
case much resembling the principal case
in this respect. In Morris v. ,Sh7ryock,
the goods were on a wharf-boat, a warehouse somewhat similar to a railroad
depot. In Kitchen v. .Sear,the attachment was levied on the goods while still
on board the railroad car.
In several of the cases, as in the
Tennessee case, there were circumstances
tending to show a rescission of the contract of sale. Thus, in Cox v. Burns,
the vendor had received back the possession of the goods from the vendee
before the levy of the attachment. In
Morris v. Shnyock, the vendees had
declined to receive the goods, and had
sent notice thereof to the vendors. In
Nlaylor v. Devine, the vendor had, prior
to the attachment, countermanded his
order for the goods; and this was held
to be a rescissior when agreed to by the
vendor; and the claim of a rescission
was held to he not inconsistent with the
vendor's claim of stoppage, both claims
being asserted by attempting to resume
possession of the goods in order to
secure either the goods or their value.
In Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Term R. 464,
the attachment upon the goods was sustained as paramount to the vendor's
right of stoppage, it having been levied
after the carrier had delivered the goods
at an inn in London, which was held to
be in effect a delivery to the vendee himself and a t.rmination of the transit.

In Parkerv. lefver, 1 Dessaus. 274,
on the other hand, the vendor had exerrised his right of stoppage prior to the
levy of the attachment ; and so also had
the vendor in Stokes v. La Riviere,
cited by counsel in 3 Term II. 466.
The dictum in Boyd v. AMosely, 2
Swan 661, that the right of stoppage
in transitu would be defeated by the
interveition of other bona fide rights,
"as, if the buyer sell the goods, or they
be legally attached for debt, as in the
present case," evidently proceeds on an
extension of the doctrine that delivery
of the goods to the carrier is a delivery
to the vendee, completes the sale and
passes the title of the goods. It would
seem to follow logically that either the
vendee or his creditors may legally treat
the property in all respects as vested in
the vendee. And so they may for all
purposes, except that of defeating the.
vendor's right of stoppage in transitu.
This peculiar right, if exercised in due
time, that is, before there be an actual
delivery to the consignee, is favored in
the law. No reason is perceived, in
looking at the features of the transaction
outside of the bill of lading, why the
endorsement of that instrument for
value should give rise to exceptional
and unusual rights as against the vendor.
The reasons for these exceptions to the
general rule are to be found in the peculiar office and characteristics of bills of
lading, which are -well stated in the
American notes to Lickbarrow v. M1ason,
I Smith's L. C., p. 889, et seq.
J. 0. PxEnO.
Memphis, Tenn.
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Supreme Court of lissouri.
]BROADWELL v. CITY OF KANSAS.
The owner of a lot abutting on a street in a city cannot recover damages from
the city for consequential injuries resulting from a change in the grade of the street;
but lie may recover for direct and positive injuries, such as the casting of earth upon
his lot and the destruction of his building thereby.
Such an injury is a taking of private property within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against taking such property without due compensation.
If, in raising the grade of a street, it is necessary to build a wall to restrain the
earth within the limits of the street, a failure to build such wall whereby the earth
rolls upon an abutting lot and injures a building, is negligence for which the city is
liable. The maxim, sic utere tuo ut alieninm non ledas, applies to municipal corporations as well as to individuals.
In a suit against the city for such negligence, the record of a judgment against
the lot-owner in a suit upon tax bills issued in payment of the work of grading, is
inadmissible in evidence.

from Lafayette Circuit Court.
Action of trespass, qdiare clausum fregit, brought by Virginia
Broadwell and her husband against the city of Kansas and John
Halpin. On the trial the following facts appeared.
Plaintiff was the owner of a brick building situated on a lot
abutting on Fifth street in the city of Kansas. In 1872 the city
raised the grade of the street over twenty feet, the work being
done by the defendant, Halpin, as contractor. The grade was
raised by filling in the line of the street with earth, which being
allowed to take its natural slope, rolled down upon the plaintiff's
lot, the base of the filling extending far upon plaintiff's lot, and
crushing the walls of and destroying her building. Tax bills were
issued for the work of grading and delivered to the contractor who
brought suit thereon against the present plaintiff and recovered
judgment thereon, which was paid. Subsequently this suit was
brought to recover the damages to the plaintiff's building caused
by the earth, thrown upon the lot.
On the trial the defendants offered in evidence the record of the
judgment in the suit on the tax bills, which offer was objected to
and overruled by the court.
Defendants requested the court to charge that if the city had
authority to grade the street, and the street was so graded under
contract, and if the work was done in the usual and ordinary way
and carefully, the verdict should be for the defendants, notwithstanding the fact that the earth used took its natural slope and
APPEAL
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rolled against and injured plaintiff's building. The court refused
so to charge, and instructed the jury in substance that, if the city
through its contractor, without any attempt 'at conaem-nation, cast
earth upon plaintiff's lot and destroyed her building, both the city
and the contractor 'weie liable for the Value of the property so
taken or destroyed; but that in estimating the damages they must
leave out of consideration any damages to the plaintiff's land by
reason of its being left below the level of the street as graded.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5700. The city of
Kansas appealed.
Karnes & Ess and W. Adams, for appellant.
Prank Titus, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, C.

J.-It

may be conceded at the outset, that the

city would not have been answerable in this action, if it were bottomed on the mere fact that consequential injuries have resulted to
plaintiffs because of the grading of the street by the contractor
Ialpin. The authorities on this point in this state, as 'well as elsewhere, are numerous and many of them are cited by counsel.
The approved doctrine on this subject, is thus sufficiently stated
by a writer of recognised authority:
"The courts, by numerous decisions, in most of the states, have
settled the law that municipal corporations, acting under authority
conferred by the legislature to make and repair, or to grade, level
and improve streets, if they keep within the limits of the street,
and do not trespass upon or invade private property, and exercise
reasonable care and skill in the performance of the work resolved
upon, are not answerable to the adjoining owner, whose lands are
not actually taken, trespassed upon or invaded, for consequential
damages to his premises, unless there is a provision in the charter
of the corporation, or in some statute, creating the liability :" 2
Dil. Mun. Corp., sect. 990.
But in this case the action is not for consequentialdamages, but
for a direct and positive injury. The contractor, Ialpin, who in
this behalf was the servant of the city, did not "keep within thle
limits of the street." On the contrary, he trespassed upon and
invaded private property. 'And for this the city is clearly answerable, and to it in such circumstances the doctrine of respondeat
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superior applies. If the contractor, while confining himself to the
area and boundaries of the street, had performed the work assigned
him with reasonable care and skill, and in consequence thereof,
some indirect-some consequential injury-had resulted therefrom,
no action would lie, and plaintiffs would be without remedy. And
to their case, according to the authorities, would be applicable that
self-contradictory maxim of "damnum absque injuria." 'This case,
however, involves no such circumstances as will a*dmit of invoking
that maxim-the injury, as before stated, being the immediate
result of the wrongful act. And we think that the liability of the
city and of the contractor may be well placed on either or both of
these grounds :1. That the injury resulted from the work not being done with
reasonable care and skill.
2. That such injury resulted from the commission of a tort.
What is reasonable care and skill is, of course, largely dependent on the purroundings of each particular case, and is therefore
a relative term. But we cannot regard that as such care and skill
which unnecessarily, not to say recklessly and wantonly, dumps on
the premises of an adjoining proprietor large quantities of earth,
covering those premises many feet in depth, crushing in the walls
of and destroying a dwelling-house situated some twenty feet from
the street. If upon making the fill required by the contract, it
became apparent that the work could not be completed without
injury, such as before mentioned, to an adjoining proprietor, unless
a wall were built to restrain the earth within the limits of the
street, then such wall should have been built, and reasonable care
and skill, as applicable in this connection, required that wall's
construction. The fact that statutory authority existed for doing
the work did not not carry with it a power to directly injure or
destroy the property of an adjoining proprietor. If it were necessary to make a fill in order to grade a street, and the embankment
were required to be raised so high that it would become necessary,
as is sometimes the case, to make cross-embankments or supports
of either earth or stone, in order to keep the principal embankment in place, no one would doubt that before the land of adjoining proprietors could be occupied by such cross-embankments,
either the consent of such proprietors would have to be obtained, or
else proper legal proceedings taken to condemn the required land.
And there can be no essential difference in principle between
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occupying one's land with earth deposited there as the incident of
making the principal embankment, and doing the same thing by
making a cross-embankment. If the owner of a private lot should
decide to fill it with earth, the fact that he had the legal and
undoubted right thus to fill his own lot up to a certain level, would
not give him the right in so doing, to dump earth on his neighbor's
lot, either directly or incidentally, and we do not perceive that the
city has any greater rights than would a co-terminous proprietor
in similar circumstances.
In a word, the maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcedas"
should govern the actions of municipal corporations as well as
those of individuals.
Moreover, section 16 of Article 1 of the Constitution of 1865
provided that, "No private property ought to be taken or applied
to public use without just compensation." Here, the city and its
servant took the property within the meaning of that section.
The taking of property within that prohibition may be either
total and absolute or a taking pro tanto. "Any injury to the property of an individual which deprives the owner of the ordinary
use of it, is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to compensation." "So a partial destruction or diminution of value of property by an act of the government which directly and not merely
incidentally affects it, is to that extent an appropriation :" Cooley
Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 680, et seq; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
13 Wall. 166; Hooker v. New Haven & North Hampton Co., 14
Conn. 146; Arinond v. G-reen Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316; Port
Huron v. Ashley, 35 Mich. 296; Eaton v. Railroad Co., 51
N. H. 504.
So far as concerns the judgment rendered against plaintiffs on
the tax-bills, we are unable to discover what relevancy such a
judgment could have in the present action, since this action is for
unliquidated damages, and could not have been pleaded in answer
to that suit: Mahan v. Ross, 18 Mo. 121; Pratt v. illenkens, Id.
158; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Mo. 494. Halpin might very properly recover for the work which he had lawfully done in grading
the street, and still both he and his employer, the city, be held
liable for the unnecessary and direct injury done to plaintiffs' property while the work was in progress.
This cause was tried in conformity to the foregoing views, both
in giving and refusing instructions, and the judgment is affirmed.

